Headnotes
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — Section 69 — Sexual intercourse by deceitful means or promise to marry — False promise of marriage — Initial intention — Mere subsequent refusal to marry does not constitute an offence under Section 69 BNS — Quashing of FIR: Where the allegations in the FIR themselves disclose that the parties were in a consensual relationship and do not indicate that the accused had made a promise to marry with the intention of never fulfilling it, the mere subsequent failure or refusal to marry cannot by itself constitute the offence under Section 69 BNS. The essential requirement in a case founded upon a promise to marry is that the promise must have been made without any intention of fulfilling it from the very beginning. A genuine promise subsequently frustrated because of circumstances, including opposition from the family, cannot automatically be converted into criminal liability under Section 69 BNS. The Supreme Court, therefore, quashed the FIR against the accused where the complaint itself indicated a consensual relationship and alleged that the accused subsequently refused marriage because his mother was not agreeable to the marriage.
Criminal law — Section 69 BNS — Promise to marry — Distinction between false promise and breach of promise: The Supreme Court has reiterated that a false promise to marry and a subsequent breach of a genuine promise are legally distinct. For Section 69 BNS to apply on the promise-to-marry limb, there must be material indicating that the accused had no intention to fulfil the promise when it was made. A mere failure to ultimately marry is insufficient.
Section 69 BNS — Relationship between consenting adults — Quashing of FIR: Where the FIR, read as a whole, indicates that the parties voluntarily entered into a relationship and the allegation of deception is not supported even by the complainant’s own narration, continuation of criminal proceedings may amount to an abuse of the process of law. The Supreme Court accordingly exercised its jurisdiction to terminate the proceedings.
Introduction
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat & Anr., Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 11526 of 2026, decided on 7 September 2026, is an important judgment concerning the interpretation of Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), particularly in cases alleging sexual intercourse on the false promise of marriage.
The judgment is significant because Section 69 BNS is a new statutory offence introduced under the post-IPC criminal law framework. Unlike the traditional legal route under Sections 375 and 90 IPC, Section 69 BNS expressly criminalises sexual intercourse obtained by certain forms of deceitful conduct, including a promise to marry made without the intention of fulfilling it.
The Supreme Court has now made an important point clear: a subsequent refusal to marry does not, by itself, establish that the original promise was false or deceitful. The prosecution must be able to point towards the absence of intention to fulfil the promise when the promise was made.
The uploaded judgment records that the appellant was accused under Section 69 BNS after an FIR was registered at Sayajiganh Police Station, Vadodara City, alleging that he had entered into physical relations with the complainant on the pretext of marriage and subsequently resiled from the promise because his mother was not agreeable to the marriage.
The Supreme Court ultimately quashed the FIR.
This decision is particularly relevant for criminal lawyers dealing with FIR quashing petitions, Section 69 BNS cases, allegations of false promise to marry, consensual relationships, bail applications and criminal proceedings arising from failed relationships.
Facts of the Case
The appellant, Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani, was accused under Section 69 BNS.
The FIR was registered at Sayajiganh Police Station, Vadodara City, Gujarat, bearing FIR No. 11196030250292 dated 20 May 2025.
The complainant alleged that the appellant had entered into physical relations with her after making a promise to marry her. Subsequently, according to the allegation, the appellant refused to marry her because his mother was not favourable to the proposed marriage.
The High Court refused to quash the FIR. While doing so, it relied upon the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675.
The matter consequently reached the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court examined the allegations contained in the FIR itself and, importantly, did not merely look at the fact that the relationship had ultimately failed.
What Does Section 69 BNS Provide?
Section 69 BNS creates a specific offence relating to sexual intercourse obtained through deceitful means or through a promise to marry made without the intention of fulfilling it.
The statutory provision states that a person who, by deceitful means or by making a promise to marry a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse with her, where such intercourse does not amount to rape, may be punished with imprisonment extending up to ten years and fine. The Explanation also includes specified forms of deceitful means, including inducement or false promise of employment or promotion and marrying by suppressing identity.
Therefore, Section 69 has an important statutory distinction from a rape allegation.
The section applies where the alleged sexual intercourse does not amount to rape.
It is therefore necessary to understand precisely what conduct Parliament intended to punish.
The Essential Ingredients of Section 69 BNS
For a case based specifically on a promise to marry, the following questions become important:
- Was there a promise to marry?
- Was the promise made to induce the woman into sexual intercourse?
- Did the accused have the intention to fulfil that promise when it was made?
- Was the promise false from its inception?
- Was the sexual relationship actually induced by the alleged deceptive promise?
- Does the alleged conduct fall within Section 69 rather than the more serious offence of rape?
The most important question after Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani is the third and fourth questions.
The crucial issue is not simply whether the marriage ultimately took place; it is whether the accused intended to fulfil the promise when he made it.
Supreme Court’s Reliance on Deepak Gulati
The High Court had relied upon Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675.
The Supreme Court in the present case reproduced the principle from Deepak Gulati that there must be adequate evidence showing that, at the relevant time and particularly at the initial stage, the accused had no intention whatsoever of keeping the promise to marry.
Deepak Gulati recognised that circumstances may arise where a person genuinely intends to marry but subsequently becomes unable to do so because of circumstances that were not anticipated.
The failure to fulfil a promise concerning a future uncertain event does not automatically amount to a misconception of fact.
This distinction is fundamental.
A false promise is different from a promise that subsequently becomes impossible or difficult to perform.
False Promise Versus Breach of Promise
This is perhaps the most important aspect of the judgment.
Suppose A tells B that he intends to marry her. At that time, A genuinely intends to marry B. Later, because of family opposition, incompatibility, change of circumstances or another unforeseen reason, the marriage does not take place.
That situation is not automatically equivalent to a person deliberately making a false promise merely to obtain sexual relations.
In contrast, suppose A never intended to marry B at all, but deliberately represents that he will marry her solely to induce her to consent to sexual intercourse.
That is qualitatively different conduct.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognised this distinction.
In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, the Court distinguished between a promise that is false from inception and a genuine promise subsequently breached. The Court held that where the promise was false when made and was intended to deceive the woman into sexual relations, the doctrine of misconception of fact may be attracted. Conversely, mere subsequent failure to fulfil a promise does not automatically make the original promise false.
The same principle is reflected in Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand, (2020) 10 SCC 108, where the Court examined the nature of the relationship and concluded that the evidence did not establish a false promise or intentional misrepresentation from the beginning.
Application of the Law to the Present Case
The Supreme Court’s reasoning becomes particularly important when the actual contents of the FIR are examined.
The parties had initially come into contact through a digital platform. A friendship developed, which subsequently became a love affair.
The complaint stated that the appellant communicated his desire to marry the complainant when they first met physically.
Thereafter, sexual relations took place.
The judgment records that sexual intercourse allegedly occurred on 12 February 2024 and again in April 2024, when the complainant stayed with the appellant in a hotel for two days.
The Supreme Court found that the complainant’s own allegations indicated a consensual relationship.
More importantly, the Court did not find material demonstrating that the appellant had induced the complainant into sexual intercourse by employing deceitful means.
The Court specifically noticed the wording of the complaint, including the allegation that on the first occasion the complainant had “succumbed to the appellant’s entreaties”, without specifically stating that the physical relationship occurred because she believed that the appellant would marry her.
That distinction was decisive.
Family Opposition Does Not Automatically Establish Fraud
Another significant circumstance was the alleged reason for the eventual refusal to marry.
The complaint itself stated that the appellant refused to marry because his mother was not agreeable to the marriage.
The Supreme Court treated this circumstance as inconsistent with the proposition that the appellant had made the promise without any intention of fulfilling it.
The Court observed that if the appellant subsequently refused because his mother did not permit the marriage, that circumstance indicated that the promise, if made, had been made with good intention rather than as a fraudulent device from the outset.
This is a particularly important observation for criminal practitioners.
Family opposition cannot automatically transform an initially genuine promise into a criminal deception.
Of course, every case will depend upon its facts. If evidence shows that family opposition was merely a later excuse and that the accused never intended to marry the complainant in the first place, the result may be different.
But the prosecution cannot simply reason backwards:
“The accused did not marry; therefore his original promise must have been false.”
That approach is precisely what the judgment rejects.
Section 69 BNS Is a Separate Offence
The Supreme Court also explained the legislative significance of Section 69 BNS.
Under the IPC framework, allegations based on a false promise to marry were commonly examined through the law relating to rape, particularly Sections 375 and 90 IPC.
Section 69 BNS has created a distinct offence addressing deceitful sexual conduct which does not amount to rape.
The Court observed that Parliament, through Section 69, has carved out fraudulent and deceitful conduct from the grave offence of rape while simultaneously providing a specific punishment for that deceptive conduct.
This is an important change in statutory architecture.
Section 69 carries imprisonment up to ten years and fine. It is classified as a cognizable and non-bailable offence triable by the Court of Session.
Therefore, a person facing an FIR under Section 69 BNS is not dealing with a minor allegation merely because the prosecution has not invoked rape provisions.
The offence carries serious criminal consequences.
Why the Quashing Jurisdiction Becomes Important
The present case also demonstrates the importance of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction.
Under the BNSS, Section 528 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to make orders necessary to give effect to the Sanhita, prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise secure the ends of justice. It corresponds substantially to Section 482 CrPC.
Accordingly, in an appropriate Section 69 BNS case, an accused can seek quashing where the FIR, even if taken at face value, does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offence.
The Supreme Court’s decision demonstrates precisely this situation.
The Court did not conduct a full-fledged criminal trial.
Instead, it examined the allegations contained in the FIR and concluded that they did not disclose the requisite deceitful conduct.
Consequently, it held that there was no reason to permit continuation of the criminal proceedings and quashed the FIR.
Critical Analysis of the Judgment
From the perspective of criminal law, the decision is important because it protects the distinction between criminal deception and the failure of a personal relationship.
A failed relationship is not necessarily a criminal offence.
Similarly, a broken promise is not necessarily a fraudulent promise.
Section 69 BNS requires something more.
The prosecution must establish the legally relevant deceptive element.
At the same time, the judgment should not be interpreted as providing blanket protection to persons accused of making false promises to marry.
If the FIR contains specific allegations showing that the accused deliberately represented that he would marry the complainant while simultaneously having no intention of doing so, and if the sexual relationship was induced by that representation, Section 69 may be attracted.
The important question is therefore the accused’s intention at the relevant time.
For defence lawyers, the judgment provides a powerful framework for examining the FIR for internal inconsistencies.
For example, the following circumstances may be significant:
- the parties were in a long-standing consensual relationship;
- the complainant voluntarily continued the relationship;
- there was no specific allegation that the promise was the reason for the first sexual encounter;
- there is evidence of genuine marriage discussions;
- families were involved in negotiations;
- engagement or other steps towards marriage were taken;
- the relationship subsequently failed because of circumstances arising later;
- the alleged reason for refusal is a subsequent event rather than evidence of an original fraudulent intention.
None of these circumstances is automatically conclusive, but collectively they may be highly relevant to determining whether the allegation discloses the ingredients of Section 69.
Practical Strategy for a Criminal Lawyer
For an accused facing an FIR under Section 69 BNS in Indore or elsewhere in Madhya Pradesh, the first step should not necessarily be to wait for the investigation to conclude.
The FIR should be carefully examined.
A lawyer should identify:
First, whether the FIR actually alleges a promise to marry.
Second, whether it alleges that the promise was false from inception.
Third, whether there is a specific allegation that the accused never intended to marry.
Fourth, whether the complainant states that sexual consent was given because of the promise.
Fifth, whether the FIR itself describes a voluntary romantic relationship.
Sixth, whether subsequent conduct of the parties is consistent with a genuine relationship.
Seventh, whether the alleged reason for the failure of marriage is a subsequent circumstance.
If the FIR itself fails to disclose the essential ingredients of Section 69, a petition under Section 528 BNSS for quashing may become an important remedy.
The defence should, however, avoid converting the quashing proceedings into a mini-trial. The principal argument should ordinarily be that even accepting the prosecution allegations at face value, the statutory ingredients are absent.
Important Precedents
1. Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675
The Supreme Court held that there must be material demonstrating that the accused had no intention to marry from the beginning. A subsequent inability to fulfil a genuine promise does not automatically constitute misconception of fact. The present judgment expressly relies upon this principle.
2. Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608
The Court clearly distinguished a false promise from a subsequent breach of a genuine promise. It also emphasised that in quashing proceedings the Court examines whether the allegations, taken at face value, disclose the offence.
3. Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand, (2020) 10 SCC 108
The Supreme Court found that the circumstances did not establish a false promise or intentional misrepresentation from inception. The case remains an important authority for distinguishing consensual relationships from sexual relations obtained through fraudulent inducement.
4. Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat, 2026 INSC 987
The present judgment applies the established distinction specifically in the context of Section 69 BNS. It makes clear that the statutory offence does not arise merely because a relationship ends in a refusal to marry. The prosecution must establish the requisite deceitful character of the conduct.
FAQs
Is a false promise to marry an offence under Section 69 BNS?
Yes. Section 69 BNS specifically criminalises sexual intercourse obtained by deceitful means or through a promise to marry made without the intention of fulfilling that promise, where the sexual intercourse does not amount to rape.
Does every broken promise to marry attract Section 69 BNS?
No. A mere subsequent breach of a genuine promise to marry does not automatically constitute an offence under Section 69 BNS. The crucial question is whether the accused lacked the intention to fulfil the promise when it was made.
What is the difference between a false promise and a breach of promise?
A false promise exists where the person makes the representation without intending to fulfil it and uses it as a deceptive means to obtain sexual intercourse. A breach of promise occurs where the person genuinely intended to fulfil the promise but subsequently failed to do so because of later circumstances.
Can family opposition be a reason for refusing marriage?
Family opposition may be a genuine subsequent circumstance. In the present case, the Supreme Court specifically considered the allegation that the appellant refused to marry because his mother was not agreeable and treated this as indicative of the possibility that the promise had originally been made in good faith.
Is Section 69 BNS the same as rape?
No. Section 69 expressly applies to sexual intercourse not amounting to rape. It creates a separate statutory offence dealing with specified deceitful conduct.
What is the punishment under Section 69 BNS?
Section 69 BNS provides imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and fine.
Is Section 69 BNS bailable?
No. Section 69 BNS is classified as a non-bailable and cognizable offence, triable by the Court of Session.
Can an FIR under Section 69 BNS be quashed?
Yes. Where the FIR, even if accepted at face value, does not disclose the essential ingredients of Section 69, the High Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court itself quashed the FIR in the present case.
What should an accused do after registration of a Section 69 BNS FIR?
The accused should immediately obtain and analyse the FIR, examine the exact allegations concerning the promise to marry, assess the chronology of the relationship and consider appropriate remedies such as anticipatory bail, regular bail, or a petition for quashing under Section 528 BNSS, depending upon the stage and facts of the case.
Does consensual sex exclude Section 69 BNS?
Not necessarily. A relationship may involve consensual sexual intercourse and yet Section 69 could apply if the consent was procured through the specific deceit contemplated by the statute. The critical issue is whether the statutory ingredients of deception are established. In the present case, however, the Supreme Court found that the FIR itself did not disclose such deceitful inducement.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s judgment in Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat, 2026 INSC 987, is an important decision on the emerging jurisprudence under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
The central principle is straightforward:
A subsequent refusal or failure to marry does not, by itself, establish the offence under Section 69 BNS; in a case based on a promise to marry, there must be material showing that the promise was made without the intention of fulfilling it, and that the alleged deceit bears the required connection with the sexual relationship.
The judgment preserves an important boundary in criminal law. The criminal justice system must punish deliberate deception, but every failed romantic relationship cannot automatically be transformed into a criminal prosecution.
At the same time, the decision should not be misunderstood as holding that allegations under Section 69 can never succeed merely because the parties were in a consensual relationship. The factual question remains whether the accused used a knowingly false promise or other deceitful means to obtain sexual intercourse.
For criminal practitioners in Indore, particularly advocates dealing with Section 69 BNS FIRs, false promise to marry cases, anticipatory bail, regular bail and petitions for quashing, the judgment provides a valuable defence framework. The FIR must be examined carefully to determine whether it actually alleges the necessary fraudulent intention from the beginning or merely narrates the breakdown of a relationship.
The judgment therefore reinforces the fundamental principle that criminal liability must arise from legally defined conduct and cannot be inferred merely from the fact that a personal promise ultimately remained unfulfilled.
Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat
Disclaimer: This information is intended for general guidance only and does not constitute legal advice. Please consult with a qualified lawyer for personalized advice specific to your situation.
Advocate J.S. Rohilla (Civil & Criminal Lawyer in Indore)
Contact: 88271 22304